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Our social democracies and welfare states are facing challenges that threaten their very survival. Boyer argues that a true social democracy requires a clear definition and a refocusing of the roles of the public and private sectors in the provision of public and social goods and services - a reimagining that keeps citizens' best interest in focus.

We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical simulations, the distortions in liability sharing between firms and financiers that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. We consider in particular the role played by the efficiency of the courts in avoiding Type I (finding an innocent firm guilty of inappropriate care) and Type II (finding a guilty firm innocent of inappropriate care) errors. This role is considered in a context where liability sharing is already distorted (when compared with first best values) due not only to the courts' own imperfect assessment of safety care levels exerted by firm but also to the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in financial contracting, as well as of non-congruence of objectives between firms and financiers on the one hand and social welfare maximization on the other. Our results indicate that an increase in the efficiency of the court system in avoiding errors raises safety care levels, thereby reducing the probability of accident, and allowing the social welfare maximizing government to impose a lower liability [higher] share for firms [financiers] as well as a lower standard level of care

In the assessment of the cost of public funds, there is a pervasive economic fallacy that is frequently repeated in public policy circles: because the cost of borrowing is higher for a private-sector firm than it is for a public-sector firm, the cost of carrying out an activity (investment, production, distribution, provision of goods and services, and borrowing) will necessarily be lower ceteris paribus in the public sector than in the private sector. The statement is erroneous because part of the government's cost of borrowing, namely the risk borne by citizens, customers, and taxpayers, is hidden from the casual observer of market interest rates or yields. The all-inclusive borrowing cost, more generally the all-inclusive cost of capital, is the same for both the public and the private sectors. I discuss four specific real cases in which the error is present: the Quebec Generations Fund, the Québec CDPQ Infra Réseau express métropolitain project, the Infrastructure Ontario methodology to assess the riskiness of costs, and the BC Hydro Site C hydroelectric megaproject. I also discuss a general fifth case, namely government support programs for businesses (grants, loans, guarantees, subsidies, etc.), which are generally justified on the fallacious claim that the cost of financing is lower for the government than for the private sector. I propose an auction process by which the true cost of business support programs could be made transparent. I conclude with an appeal for a more rigorous use and management of public funds because miscalculation, misinformation, mismanagement, and fallacious analysis will eventually backfire.

Pricing copyrighted works or assets so that creators are competitively compensated has always been a difficult task given the information good character of such works. Doing it in the digital era is even more challenging. I consider Hertzian radio, satellite radio, and interactive music streaming services, and I argue that annual competitive royalties in Hertzian radio should be increased from $100 million to $450 million. I further argue that this gap should not be filled by primary users alone but by a broader set of beneficiaries, including the general public and the government.

Les douze principes de la rémunération incitative En général, la rémunération incitative ou au rendement n'est pas souhaitable car elle soumet l'employé au risque de fluctuations de son salaire et elle est coûteuse à gérer. Elle peut être justifiée par quatre facteurs importants pour la performance d'une organisation : l'aléa moral, la sélection adverse, la nécessité d'inciter une coopération fructueuse, la nécessité de lutter contre de coûteuses contraintes institutionnelles ou réglementaires. La rémunération incitative doit être différenciée de la rémunération variable conçue à des fins de partage de risque. Ainsi, un système de rémunération variable n'est pas nécessairement un système de rémunération au rendement. Son objectif est de créer un niveau adéquat de congruence au sein d'une organisation de manière telle que la poursuite des intérêts individuels contribue à la réalisation des objectifs de l'organisation. Les formules de rémunération actuellement en vigueur sont rarement les meilleures possibles pour l'atteinte des objectifs fixés, d'où la nécessité de rappeler les douze principes fondamentaux.

Jean-Jacques Laffont a beaucoup contribué à l'étude de l'efficacité relative des organisations et institutions responsables du développement et de l'implémentation des réformes dans le secteur public. Il a fait preuve en cette matière d'une détermination et d'une rigueur exemplaires dans la caractérisation des cadres institutionnels pertinents à comparer. Le présent article traite de trois de ces analyses à partir de Boyer et Laffont [1997,1999,2003]: les propriétés des règles efficaces de responsabilité étendue en protection de l'environnement, l'émergence de la réglementation incitative comme instrument d'implémentation dans une perspective d'économie politique constitutionnelle, et l'impact d'une concurrence accrue sur l'intensité des incitations dans un secteur public réglementé.